# Superlend Etherlink Incident Report & Wind-Down Plan

### Summary

Two BTC-denominated lending markets on Etherlink (WBTC and LBTC) were affected by a rounding precision vulnerability inherited from the Aave v3 codebase.

* Total impact: \~0.68 BTC (\~$48k)
* User funds: Not directly affected
* Status: Fully patched

All deposits remain accessible, and no user action is required.

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### User Impact

* All user funds remain safe and withdrawable
* No positions were liquidated
* No wallets were directly exploited
* The impact was isolated to protocol reserves, not individual users

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### What Happened

Between February 26 and March 16 2026, automated contracts exploited a rounding asymmetry in the AToken burn mechanism used in Aave v3-based lending markets.

By repeatedly cycling deposits and withdrawals, attackers extracted a very small amount of value per transaction. While negligible per cycle, the attack was executed at high frequency over several days, leading to a cumulative impact.

Affected markets:

* slWBTC: \~0.3377 BTC
* slLBTC: \~0.3448 BTC

Total: \~0.68 BTC

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### Root Cause

The issue originates from a rounding behavior in Aave v3’s accounting logic, where both mint (deposit) and burn (withdrawal) operations round in a way that creates a small imbalance in favor of withdrawals.

This behavior has since been refined in newer Aave versions. Superlend’s Etherlink deployment inherited this earlier implementation.

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### Why This Was Exploitable on Etherlink

On higher-cost networks, this type of rounding imbalance is not economically viable to exploit due to transaction fees.

However, Etherlink’s ultra-low transaction costs made it possible to execute the exploit repeatedly at scale, turning a minor precision issue into a meaningful extraction over time.

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### Current Status & Remediation

* The vulnerability has been fully patched across all affected pools
* All markets remain operational and accessible
* 0.1 BTC will be restored to reserves immediately
* The remaining \~0.58 BTC will be covered progressively over time through protocol revenue

We are committed to restoring full reserve health in a sustainable and transparent manner.

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### Etherlink Markets Wind-Down

Following this incident and a broader strategic evaluation, Superlend will begin a structured wind-down of its Etherlink lending markets and vaults over the coming months.

This decision reflects:

* Limited ecosystem liquidity depth
* Constrained long-term scalability
* A shift toward our core strength: cross-chain aggregation

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### What This Means for Users

* Withdrawals remain fully available at all times
* New deposits will be phased out gradually, with advance notice
* A detailed timeline will be shared for each market
* The Superlend aggregator continues to operate normally across 15+ chains

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### Forward Focus

Superlend continues to scale as a cross-chain lending aggregator, connecting users to hundreds of markets across multiple ecosystems.

This incident impacts protocol reserves, not the core product or user funds.

We remain focused on:

* Strengthening risk management frameworks
* Improving deployment standards across chains
* Building a more resilient, aggregation-first platform

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### Full Technical Report

For a detailed breakdown of the vulnerability, exploit mechanics, and on-chain references:

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